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Water availability in semiarid regions usually exhibits patterns of extreme variability. 
Even in intensively controlled basins, some users are subject to low levels of water reliability, 
and more vulnerable to periods of extreme scarcity. To reduce their risk exposure more 
flexible instruments, such as voluntary exchanges of water among users, are required. Recent 
changes in the Spanish water Law have given an initial impulse to allow for leases of water 
use rights. Properly designed and monitored, this instrument provides some flexibility to 
water management, and may increase the economic use efficiency as well as mitigate the 
adverse economic effects of droughts. 
This paper looks at the risks and uncertainty dimensions of water markets, which have 
not been paid much attention in the literature. It analyses, from theoretical and empirical 
standpoints, the role that uncertainty plays in market participants’ decisions and its impact on 
gains from trade. 
Two models have been developed to carry out the empirical application. One is a 
stochastic and two-stage discreet programming model which simulates irrigators behaviour 
and the other is a spatial equilibrium model to compute market exchange and equilibrium. 
Water market price endogeneity is solved by an iterative process, which characterise price 
uncertainty from the results obtained from the spatial equilibrium model. Hydrological risk is 
characterised at the irrigation farm level through the variation of the water allowances served 
for irrigation. The application is performed on eleven irrigated farms in a district of the 
Guadalquivir Valley (Southern Spain). 
It is shown how water availability uncertainty reduces farmers’ benefits because of the 
fact that they must take ex – ante decisions. However, if market participation is allowed once 
water allowances become known, even at an uncertain price, the benefit losses are partly 
mitigated. From a methodological standpoint, these results suggest that the agricultural water 
market benefits estimates found in the literature may be undervalued as a result of omitting 
the option to participate in the market in the mix of possible strategies. Exchanging water in 
annual spot markets allows for the reduction of farmers’ economic vulnerability caused by the 
variability and uncertainty of water supply within an irrigation season. 
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MODELLING SPOT WATER MARKETS UNDER UNCERTAIN WATER SUPPLY 
 
1. Introduction 
Water availability in semi-arid regions usually exhibits patterns of extreme variability, 
which have been usually dealt with developing larger physical infrastructures. As costs of 
developments increase, the expansion of water supplies is limited. Even in highly controlled 
basins, some users are subject to low levels of water reliability, being vulnerable to periods of 
extreme scarcity. Water markets have been proposed as an instrument for dealing with water 
scarcity and justified from the point of view of economic efficiency. The potential welfare 
gains from the reallocation of water resources through voluntary exchange have been shown 
to be substantial (Vaux and Howitt, 1984; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Becker, 1995). 
These benefits are specially large when supplies are reduced by the occurrence of a drought, 
mitigating its economic impact (Miller, 1996). 
Most empirical studies dealing with the analysis of the potential welfare gains of water 
markets have neglected the uncertain nature of water availability. Simulations of water 
markets outcomes have rarely taken into account that water variability may have an effect on 
market activity. Empirical evidence shows that uncertainty about the actual amount to which a 
water right holder is entitled can limit the development of permanent rights markets in favour 
of annual spot or option markets, as is the case in California, where the more insecure 
appropriative water rights are predominant (Howitt, 1998). 
According to Antle’s “risk-efficiency” hypothesis (1983), risk can affect economic 
efficiency both from the technical (productivity) or allocative (input decisions) points of view. 
In this sense, uncertain water availability influences the optimality of production decisions. In 
the present paper, we analyse the effect of uncertainty in water supply on the ex-ante optimal 
decisions and ex-post market efficiency of a participant in a spot water market. 
Two models have been developed to carry out the empirical application. One is a 
stochastic two-stage discreet programming model that simulates irrigators’ behaviour. The 
other is a spatial equilibrium model that computes market exchanges and equilibrium. Water 
market price endogeneity is solved by an iterative process, which allows to characterise price 
uncertainty from the results obtained from the spatial equilibrium model. Hydrological risk is 
characterised at the irrigation farm level through the variation of the water allowances served 
for irrigation. The application is performed on eleven irrigation farms belonging to an 
irrigation district of the Guadalquivir Valley (South Spain). 
It is shown how water availability uncertainty reduces farmers’ benefits because of the 
fact that they must take ex–ante decisions. However, if market participation is allowed once 
water allowances become known, even at an uncertain price, the benefit losses are partly 
mitigated. From a methodological standpoint, these results suggest that the agricultural water 
market benefits estimates found in the literature may be undervalued as a result of omitting 
the option to participate in the market in the mix of possible strategies. Exchanging water in 
annual spot markets allows for the reduction of farmers’ economic vulnerability caused by the 
variability and uncertainty of water supply within an irrigation season. 
 
2. Production decisions under uncertainty about water availability 
In irrigated agriculture, most decisions regarding cropping schedule and certain field 
operations are taken when the farmer is not sure about the amount of water available for 
irrigation. In many Mediterranean areas, the amount of water that corresponds to a farmer 
presents a high level of interanual variability, so agricultural producers generally face a 
considerable level of uncertainty about their final water allotment. Such uncertainty and 
farmers’ attitudes toward risk, as well as many other stochastic factors inherent to agriculture 
production, influence their decisions and water use.   2
Uncertainty about water availability can be represented by a probability distribution of 
water allotments, which translates into a probability distribution of profits. Because of 
diminishing marginal productivity of water, profit reductions in dry years are greater than 
profit increases in years of above average water availability. The implication is 
straightforward: the bigger the variability the greater the cost it imposes on producers. Such 
cost comes from two different sources. First, profit variability caused by variability of the 
source of uncertainty. That is, the effect of risk on expected profit. Second, the effect of 
uncertainty on farmer’s decisions, that is, the disutility of profit variability. 
Just (1975) shows that risk can influence decisions of a risk-neutral producer if the 
random variable affect non-linearly the producer’s objective function. When the relation 
between the source of variability and profit is linear, risk only affects risk-averse and risk-
lovers producers, and the cost of uncertainty is given by profit variability and risk attitudes 
(Just, 1975; Babcock and Shogren, 1995). On the other hand, if risk enters non-linearly in the 
profit function, there is a cost derived of such risk even for risk-neutral producers (Just, 1975; 
Chambers, 1983; Babcock and Shogren, 1995), as expected profits are affected by risk. In 
such case it must also be accounted for how risk enters the profit function (Antle, 1983). 
Few studies have dealt with uncertainty in water availability and their effect on 
production decisions. Howitt and Taylor (1993) analyse the case of a risk-averse producer that 
maximises her expected utility (which depends on profit) in a context of uncertainty about 
water availability. They show that the Value of Marginal Product of water in the optimum 
exceeds the expected shadow price of the resource, and water is used less intensively than 
under certainty for a price equal to its mathematical expectation. That is, production decisions 
are equivalent of those under certainty for an allotment below the mean allotment value. 
 
3. Participation in a spot water market under uncertain water availability. 
The problem faced by an individual producer that participates in a competitive annual 
spot water market in absence of uncertainty, can be expressed as:   
Maxw  πm(w) = π(w) + Pm(D-w)                   [1] 
where w is the amount of water used for production; D is the allotment the producer is entitled 
to; Pm is the market price for water; πm(w) is the total profit function for the producer; and 
π(w) denotes the profits derived from producing using w. π(w) is a restricted profit function, 
with a negative second derivative (Chambers, 1988; Cornes, 1992), that can be defined as: 
π(w)={maxz pq(w, z)– c′z / ∀ w}               [ 2 ]  
where z is a vector of inputs other than water; p is output price; q(w,z) is the production 
function; and c′ is the input costs vector. Therefore, it is assumed that profit function π(w) 
only depends on the amount of water used, being the optimal allocation of the inputs z 
implicit in the amount of water used. The term Pm(D-w) represents the cost incurred for 
buying water or the benefit of selling water in the market. 
Participation of a producer in a water market is going to be influenced by all sources 
of risk and uncertainty. For example, if productive risk causes an excessive use of water, it 
can be assumed that it would reduce water supplied by sellers in the market, and increase 
water demanded by buyers. This is true as long as the market price for water is not greater 
(smaller) than the disutility for the producer that participates as a seller (buyer). 
Turner and Perry (1997) analyse the hypothetical effect of uncertainty regarding water 
availability in the amount of water supplied by Oregon farmers for environmental purposes. 
Their empirical analysis focuses on how uncertainty influences the adoption of water saving 
strategies by farmers, so they can sell it on a market. Turner and Perry (1997) do not analyse 
the behaviour of potential buyers. Using recursive stochastic programming models, they 
conclude that if uncertainty is not considered in the modelling water supply is overestimated. 
Under uncertain water availability water supplied by sellers is therefore reduced.   3
In their previously mentioned paper, Howitt and Taylor (1993) assume that variability 
of allotments transforms into variability of the opportunity cost of water. In a competitive 
water market, the cost of using water for production is given by its market price, the purchase 
cost for the buyer and the opportunity cost for the seller that does not sell it. In such context, a 
change in allotment implies a change in market price only if it affects all users. 
In this sense, it is important to clarify some points regarding the effect of allotment D. 
The amount of water available for a user determines the shadow price for water, and therefore 
her willingness to pay and to accept. An increase in water allotment, ceteris paribus, does not 
imply a change in the optimal amount of water used by a buyer, but increases the amount sold 
in the market (Dinar and Letey, 1991; Weinberg et al., 1995). Similarly, an increase in 
allotment reduces the amount to be bought in the market. The underlying assumption, that the 
market price does not change, is clearly unrealistic, as it is assumed that only the allotment of 
the producer considered changes. In practice, it can be expected that a significant variation in 
water availability affects market price for water, and therefore the optimal level of water use. 
This implies that, assuming uncertainty regarding allotment D, but certainty regarding 
price for water, the optimal water use is identical to the case of certain water availability. 
However, if uncertainty about water allotment implies uncertainty regarding market price for 
water, then optimal production decisions differ from those taken under certainty. 
For a risk-neutral producer first order conditions are given as: 
π’(w) = E[Pm]                   [ 3 ]  
The existence of a market for water eliminates the effect of uncertainty regarding 
allotment D, as it transfers the uncertainty to the price of water to be formed in the market 
place. The problem is then reduced to that in which input price is uncertain. In reality, 
uncertainty about water availability still has an indirect influence, as water scarcity is what 
determines the market price for water, but as far as the analysis is concerned it does not. 
The effect of uncertain input prices has been studied by Turnovsky (1969), Batra and 
Ullah (1974) and Blair (1974). Their main conclusion is that, under uncertainty regarding 
input price, input use and output are less (more) for a risk-averse (lover) producer than in 
absence of uncertainty. Batra and Ullah (1974) also show that under DARA, the effect of an 
increase in uncertainty (mean-preserving spread of the PDF) is a decrease in input use. An 
increasing variance-preserving spread is identical to an increase in input price under certainty. 
In the following analysis it is assumed that a risk-averse producer faces uncertainty 
regarding water availability and therefore also regarding the market price for water. The 
producer has to decide the amount of water to use, and therefore the amount of water to buy 
or sell in the market. The risk-averse producer maximises its expected utility without being 
certain of the price of water, which is a random variable (probability distribution known), as: 
Maxw E[U(πm(w))] = E[U(π(w) - Pm(w-D))]               [4] 
First order conditions for problem [4], that are derived in the appendix, imply that 
expected utility is maximised when marginal profit derived of the productive water use is 
more (less) than the expected market price for water. Under water price uncertainty, a 
producer that decides to use more water that its known allotment (a buyer) will use less water 
than it would under certainty for a price equals to E[Pm]. On the other hand, a producer that 
decides not to use her full allotment (a seller) will use more water than it would under 
certainty for a price equal to E[Pm]. This result is consistent with those of Batra and Ullah 
(1974) and Howitt and Taylor (1993). The result in the case of the sellers is also similar to the 
empirical results obtained by Turner and Perry (1997) for risk-neutral farmers. If buyers use 
less water than in absence of uncertainty, demanding less water, and sellers use more, 
supplying less, then the effect of uncertainty is a shift to the left in both water demand and 
supply. As a result, market activity is reduced. The effect on price is undetermined.   4
First order conditions imply that a producer takes initial production decisions such that 
the optimal water use is wI*, expecting to buy or sell an amount wI*-D in the water market. 
Such initial decisions determine the new restricted profit function, which can b expressed as: 
   π(w/wI*),  where ∂π(w/wI*)/∂w≤ ∂π(w)/∂w               [ 5 ]  
Once uncertainty is resolved, allotment Df and market price for water Pmf are known. 
Then the producer faces a problem that can be expressed as: 
Maxw π(w/wI*) – Pmf(w-Df)                      [ 6 ]  
First order conditions are given as: 
π’(w/wI*) = Pmf                           [7] 
 
4. Modelling Framework 
Some authors have criticised the excessive importance given in the literature to 
accounting for risk aversion in farm modelling with respect to other issues such as the 
inclusion of tactical responses or the characterisation of probability distributions (Hardaker et 
al., 1991; Pannell and Nordblom, 1998; Hardaker, 2000; Pannell et al., 2000; and Lien and 
Hardaker, 2001). According to their view, farmers are not that much interested in avoiding the 
risks they face, what is not always possible, as in foreseeing its effects and responding 
tactically by modifying their initial decisions as uncertainty is resolved (Marshall et al., 1997). 
This is independent of their attitudes toward risk. Even a risk-neutral farmer bears a cost from 
resource variability (Babcock and Shogren, 1995), so he is interested in responding to reduce 
such cost. This can be accounted for including tactical responses in farm programming 
models. In the case of uncertain water availability possible responses are changes in water 
applications to crops, crop abandonment, purchasing water, etc. 
  Pannell et al. (2000) review studies that deal with the inclusion of tactical responses in 
farm modelling using discrete stochastic programming. The inclusion of the possibility of 
tactically adjusting production decisions results in an increase in expected profit ranging 
between 10 and 20%. On the other hand, including risk aversion reduces expected profit 
between 1 and 3%. The reason is that the profit function is flat near the optimum, so risk 
aversion modifies optimal decisions but barely affects results in terms of farmers’ welfare. 
For discrete variables the effect of risk aversion is usually larger. This means the welfare 
improvement effect of risk avoidance is relatively small (Pannell et al., 2000). 
  Modelling tactical responses has a greater effect on model output because such 
responses tend to occur in extreme situations, when the effect of variability in expected profit 
is much greater than the effect of risk, and decisions are modified to a larger extent than if risk 
aversion alone is considered (Hardaker et al., 1991; Babcock and Shogren, 1995; Pannell et 
al., 2000). Incorporating risk aversion in a model affects production decisions, but does not 
improve substantially the results obtained with a model that assumes risk neutrality, at least if 
the objective is to evaluate policies or make recommendations (Lien and Hardaker, 2001). If 
the objective is to accurately predict behaviour, risk aversion is more important, but still 
secondary to other risk related issues such as tactical behaviour (Hardaker, 2000). 
Uncertainty regarding water supply affects production decisions taken at the beginning 
of the cropping season, some of which can be lately modified or adjusted. In such a situation, 
the key issue to consider is the set of possible strategies and tactical responses the producer 
can use as uncertainty is resolved. Entering a water market is not a marginal decision but a 
tactical response to face uncertainty relating water supply. 
There is an important conceptual issue that arises when considering water uncertainty 
in a water market model. In spot water markets, as market price for water depends on water 
availability, uncertainty about allotments results in uncertainty about the market price for 
water. The problem is not that of uncertain resource availability but of uncertain input price.   5
  Most studies dealing with water transfers in a context of water uncertainty analyse the 
effect of such uncertainty on farmer’s willingness to accept for water to transfer it for non-
agricultural uses (Taylor and Young, 1995; Turner and Perry, 1997; Willis and Whittlesey, 
1998). They derive farmers’ supply for water under uncertainty parameterising either the price 
of water (and computing the amount of water sold for each price) or water allotments (and 
computing dual values of water). None of them considers uncertainty in water price. 
Such uncertainty has implications in the behaviour of farmers. Market participation is 
a tactical response to a surplus or deficit of water with respect to expected water available, 
and must be considered in the set of possible activities. If market outcome is to be simulated 
based on farmer’s decisions, not only uncertainty regarding water availability but also 
regarding water price has to be considered. Otherwise, water exchanges would be simulated 
based on a behaviour that does not take into the account the possibility of entering the market. 
Farmers’ decisions in presence of uncertainty in water allotment and market price for 
water have been simulated using a Stochastic Programming with Recourse (SPR) modelling 
approach. Many authors coincide in that SPR or Discrete Stochastic Programming (DSP), as 
developed by Cocks (1968) and Rae (1971), is the most adequate method to represent 
resource uncertainty. It allows to simulate the sequential nature of productive decisions taken 
in a context of uncertainty regarding water availability (Turner and Perry, 1997). DSP has 
been used by Taylor and Young (1995), Turner and Perry (1997) and Keplinger et al. (1998) 
to model uncertainty in water available for production in irrigated agriculture. 
Marshall et al. (1997) use the distribution method to analyse the optimal drainage 
recirculation strategy for a representative dairy farm in New South Wales in a context of 
uncertain water availability. They include the possibility of selling or purchasing water at an 
exogenous constant price as a tactical response but they do not model market exchanges. 
  Market equilibrium models are usually solved using endogenous price models, such as 
the ones developed by Enke (1951), Samuelson (1952) and Takayama and Judge (1964) to 
solve the problem of equilibrium in spatially separated markets. Such type of models have 
been used to simulate water allocation and water market exchanges in the papers by Flinn and 
Guise (1970), Vaux and Howitt (1984), Booker and Young (1994) and Becker (1995). 
  In this sense, the model used to simulate the water market maximizes economic 
surplus derived from market participation by all users, and can be written as: 










0 ) (             [ 8 a ]  
s.t:   Σi mi ≤ 0            [ 8 b ]  
   -mi ≤ Di  ∀i           [ 8 c ]    
where fi(mi) is the inverse demand function for water for user i (marginal profit); mi = wi – Di 
is the amount of water bought (mi>0) or sold (mi<0) in the market by user i; wi is the total 
amount of water used by user i. First restriction forces market equilibrium making all amounts 
supplied greater or equal than amounts demanded. The second restriction impedes a user to 
sell in the market an amount of water greater than her allotment Di. Market price for water is 
derived as the dual value of the first restriction. 
  This model yields an optimal allocation of water among users, that is equivalent to that 
of a central planner that knows each user’s water demand function. Such allocation presents 
Kaldor-Hicks optimality with respect to the initial one in which each user can only use her 
initial allotment. If compensation among users takes places at the market equilibrium price, 
then the final allocation of water would be Pareto-optimal (Calatrava, 2002). 
In the present study, only water supply risk has been considered. The analysis here is 
centred on uncertainty about water availability, the main risk-related issue of interest for 
farmers in the area, so other sources of risk are not included.   6
In the Guadalquivir River Basin, water allotment for farmers are usually determined in 
spring, after fall and winter rains, so uncertainty about water supply directly affects 
production decisions regarding crops that are planted on autumn (winter crops), and indirectly 
affects crops planted on spring through crop substitution effects. To account for this 
uncertainty on allotment and its effect on crop scheduling decisions two different stages are 
considered. On a first stage, crops are scheduled under uncertainty assuming perfect 
information with respect to the probability distribution of both water availability and water 
prices. On a second stage, farmers may, once the definitive allotment is known, modify to a 
certain extent those initial decisions. Winter crops considered are hard wheat, soft wheat, 
sugar beet, potato and garlic. The other crops are cotton, corn, sunflower, citrus and olive tree. 
  Decision variables are surface and water devoted to each crop in each stage. Surface 
devoted to winter crops on the first stage can not be modified, while surface devoted to the 
rest of the crops can be reallocated. If s denotes the state of nature and i denotes the farm, this 
problem can be stated as follows: 
Max Σs Probsπis                [ 9 a ]  
Subject to: 
-πis+ΣkS2iks[Fk(w2iks)(Pk+UEk-CRTk) -C(S2ik) -CRkw2iks]-CFi –PMsM2is=0    ∀s     [9b] 
Σk S1ik ≤ SAUi              [ 9 c ]  
Σk S2iks ≤ SAUi   ∀s             [ 9 d ]  
Σk S2iks w2iks -M2is ≤ SAUi Ds ∀s            [ 9 e ]  
S1i “fallow” = α S1i”COP”             [ 9 f ]  
S2i“fallow”s = α S2i”COP”s  ∀s            [ 9 g ]  
S1i “hard wheat” ≤ CTDi SAUi             [ 9 h ]  
S1i”winter” = S2i”winter”s   ∀s, k∈ ”winter”          [ 9 i ]  
S1ik , S2iks , w1ik , w2iks ≥ 0   ∀ k,s           [ 9 j ]  
where: 
S1ik is the area assigned on stage 1 by farm i to crop k; 
S2iks is the area assigned on stage 2 by farm i to crop k under state of nature s; 
w1ik is the amount of water applied on stage 1 by farm i to crop k; 
w2iks is the amount of water applied on stage 2 by farm i to crop k under state of nature s 
Fk(wik) is the crop-water response function for crop k; 
Pk is market price for crop k; 
UEk is the per hectare UE payment for crop k; 
Cik(Sik) is the cost function for crop k and farm i (excludes irrigation, harvest, transportation 
and fixed costs); 
CRTk are harvest and transportation costs for crop k; 
CRk are irrigation costs for crop k; 
CFi are fixed costs for farm i; 
SAUi is the total area of farm i; 
Probs is the probability of state of nature s; 
Ds is water allotment per hectare under state of nature s;   
PMs is market price for water under state of nature s; 
M2is is the amount of water traded in the market in stage 2 by farm i under state of nature s; 
α is the percentage of land devoted to set-aside in order to receive the area payments; 
CTDi is hard wheat quota for farm i in proportional terms. 
  If only uncertainty in water availability was considered, expressions [9b] and [9e]can 
be rewritten as: 
-πis+ΣkS2iks[Fk(w2iks)(Pk+UEk -CRTk)-Cik(Sik)-CRkw2iks]-CFi=0 ∀s         [9b] 
  Σk S2iks w2iks ≤ SAUi Ds  ∀s                 [9e]   7
The farm model has been calibrated to observed crop schedules for each farm type 
using Positive Mathematical Programming (Howitt, 1995). The previous model determines 
optimal decisions for stage 1. A second model is used to derive inverse water demand 
functions for each farm. This model takes those initial decisions as given and computes 
optimal second stage decisions for different water allotments ranging from 0 to 10,000 m
3/ha, 
but without considering costs or revenues from the water market. That is, the model obtains 
the profit derived from the optimal crop schedule for each possible level of water use. From 
these profit functions inverse water demand functions are obtained and used to simulate water 
exchanges in the market using a spatial equilibrium model such as the one in [8]. 
  The water market model provides with the optimal allocation of water for each level of 
water availability (D), that is the amount of water bought or sold by each farm (mi) and the 
equilibrium price for water (Pm). Profit from water use is calculated from the previously 
estimated profit functions using the amount of water used (SAUiD + mi) as argument; revenue 
or cost from selling or buying water in the market is calculated as –miPm. Their sum is the 
total profit for each farm. 
   The problem is which values to assign to the PMs parameter (market price for water 
under each state of nature) in the decision model, as this price is clearly endogenous in the 
problem. No data about real market prices are available. Beare et al. (1999) use a pricing 
mechanism that determine water prices as a function of water availability. As perfect 
information has been assumed, an iterative process can be used instead to solve this problem, 
process commented below and depicted in figure 1. 
Figure 1 
 
First, some initial values for water price under each state of nature are used to 
characterise uncertainty regarding water price. Then the farm model is run using those initial 
prices and profit and inverse water demand functions are obtained. Market exchanges are 
simulated using those functions, and the equilibrium prices obtained are used to characterise 
uncertainty in the farm model. This process is repeated until prices obtained form the market 
model converge to those used in the model from which demand functions where derived. The 
convergence criteria is that market prices obtained for each state of nature differ in less than 
0.001 euros/m
3 from those prices used to characterise uncertainty in the SPR model. 
  The empirical application has been performed on eleven irrigated farms belonging to 
an irrigation district in the Guadalquivir River Basin (Southern Spain). Farms range from 2 to 
188 hectares and differ on their fixed assets, irrigation technologies and cropping patterns. 
Water uncertainty has been characterised using data, from the period 1978-2000, on 
water stocks and releases for the dam from which the irrigation district is served and 
individual water allotments. At stage 1 (autumn), the level of water stored in the dam is in its 
lower yearly levels. When this level is above 60 Hm
3 the final allotment available for farmers 
when the irrigation season starts (in spring) can be determined with a 99% probability. For 
levels below 60 Hm


















entirely on winter rains which are subject to high variability. Table 1 shows the two scenarios 
of uncertainty in allotment depending on the dam stock level at the beginning of autumn. 
Modelling has been performed for both scenarios, and solved using CONOPT2 of GAMS. 
 
Table 1. Scenarios of water uncertainty within a season. 
Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
 Stock<40 Hm




3/ha) Probability Allotment  (m
3/ha) Probability 
4,900 0.250 5,500  0.4445 
4,500 0.125 5,200  0.1111 
4,000 0.125 4,500  0.2222 
3,000 0.250 3,100  0.2222 
500 0.125     
0 0.125     
 
5. Results 
  Results from the SPR model that includes market participation as a tactical response 
(INCCP model) are compared with results from other two models: the first one is a certainty 
model in which allocation decisions are taken in absence of uncertainty (CERT model); the 
second is a SPR model in which only uncertainty regarding water availability has been 
considered (INCSP model; uncertainty in water price not considered). These three models 
provide profit and inverse water demand functions under different modelling assumptions that 
are used to simulate market exchanges. The results presented here refer to market outcome for 
each model assumption (shown on table 2). Due to space limitations some of the results 
cannot be shown and will be just commented to focus on the most important results, those of 
the market. They are shown in a longer version of the paper. 
 
Table 2. Models and assumptions. 
Model Uncertainty  regarding  water 
availability 
Market as a tactical response 
(price uncertainty) 
Scenario of uncertainty (shown 
in table 2) 
CERT  NO NO None 
INCSP-1  YES NO  1 
INCSP-2  YES NO  2 
INCCP-1  YES YES  1 
INCCP-2  YES YES  2 
  







































































Profits obtained for each level of water availability are higher for the model CERT 
(absence of uncertainty) than for the other models. When the option to participate in the water   9
market is included as a tactical response profit increases with respect to when only water 
uncertainty without tactical response is considered. Profits are also lower for uncertainty 
scenario 1 than for scenario 2. Patterns for the rest of the farms are similar. Water demand 
functions obtained are more inelastic under uncertainty. 
Equilibrium prices for water are similar for all models as it can be seen in figure 3. 
Only for model INCSP-1 (tactical response not included and uncertainty scenario 1) water 
prices are clearly lower. When uncertainty is higher, production decisions result in lower 
marginal profits from water use and water is less valued, therefore reducing its scarcity price. 
If water market is included as a tactical response then decisions result in higher water values 
and equilibrium price raise to similar levels than in absence of uncertainty. Table 3 shows 
market positions for all farm types and levels of water allotment. 
 
Table 3. Market positions for all farms and models. 
Allotment (10
3m
3/ha) F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9  F10  F11 
0,1  S* S* S* S* S* S* S* S* S* B  B 
1  S* S* S* S* S* S* B  B  B  B  B 
2 S*  S  B  B  S S* B  B  B  B  B 
3 S  S  B  B  S S B  B  B  B  B 
4 S  S  B  B  S S B  B  B  B  B 
5  B  B  B  B  S S S S S B  B 
6  B  B  B  S S S S S S B  B 
Nota: S denotes seller; B denotes buyer; S* means the whole allotment is sold. In the six framed values market 
position is switched to buyer in those models with tactical response. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of total water available in the Irrigation district exchanged in the 
market for each level of water allotment (all models). 
Allotment
1  Water available in 
the whole ID
2 
CERT  INCSP-1 INCSP-2 INCCP-1 INCCP-2 
0  0  0 0 0 0  0,00 
0.2  1.226  92.82 92.82 92.82 92.82 92.82 
1  6.129  67.96 67.96 67.96 67.96 67.96 
2  12.258  40.93 42.46 39.53 39.66 39.54 
3  18.387  20.59 22.49 18.79 19.02 18.83 
4  24.516 10.07  10.47  8.94  9.36  9.05 
5  30.645  5.67 6.10 4.16 4.64 4.42 






  Table 4 shows the percentage of total water available exchanged in the market for each 
model and uncertainty scenario. Exchanges are higher for low levels of water availability, 
when differences in marginal values of water are greater. For allotment levels above 4200 
m
3/ha (mean allotment), exchanged volumes represent less than 10% of total water 
availability. This is consistent with the literature on water markets, in the sense that in years 
of normal availability market activity is reduced. Uncertainty slightly reduces market activity. 
With respect to profits achieved by farms through market participation, the model 
without uncertainty (CERT) provides smaller percent increases of profit. The models with 
market included as a tactical response result in higher percent profit increases than model that 
only consider uncertainty in water supply. That is, considering the possibility of entering the 
market as a tactical response results in production decisions that improve the potential of 
water markets to increase farm profits. From a decisional point of view, the possibility of 
entering an ex-post water market reduces the perception farmers have about water availability 
risk, reducing the effect of uncertainty on production decisions. Furthermore, this effect is 
greater under uncertainty scenario 1 (higher uncertainty).   10
Similar conclusions can be derived from figures 3, that show the level of profits 
achieved through the water market under each scenario and model assumption for each level 
of water allotment. Profits are expressed as a percentage of the profit obtained from the model 
without uncertainty (CERT, represented by a green flat line at level 100%). For reasons of 
space figures corresponding to some of the farms, whose patterns are similar to those shown 
have been skipped. Differences found among farms and scenarios deserve some comments. 
Under uncertainty scenario 1, profit is generally below that of model CERT. Profits 
when market has been considered as a tactical response (model INCCP-1) are greater than 
profits when it has not (model INCSP-1). In some cases, differences are small, but in others, 
as for farms 5 and 6, inclusion of the market as a tactical response allows to eliminate most of 
the negative effect that uncertainty has on decisions and profit achievable through the water 
market. There is one exception to this general pattern. Farms 10 and 11 present higher profit 
with than without uncertainty. The reason is that the stochastic decision model does not allow 
them to reallocate their land among crops as all their area is permanently devoted to citrus and 
olive trees respectively. The effect of uncertainty over their market profits is indirectly given 
by the effect of such uncertainty on the rest 9 farms and therefore on the market equilibrium 
and outcome. For model INCSP-1 uncertainty reduces market profit for the other 9 farms that 
take less efficient decisions than under certainty, and market price is reduced. As farms 10 
and 11 are always water buyers, this allows them to increase their market profit as they 
purchase water at a lower price. For model INCCP-1 the other 9 farms take more adequate 
production decisions and water is more valuable. Then farms 10 and 11 buy water more 
expensively and their profit gets reduced. For uncertainty scenario 2, differences among 
models are slight, being the effect of uncertainty and modelling assumptions very small. 
 
Figures 3. Water market profits for each assumption and scenario considered (percentages of 

































































































































































































































  It has been shown analytically that the possibility of entering a spot water market 
eliminates the effect of the uncertainty directly derived from variable water availability. It 
influences production decisions taken by a risk-averse producer indirectly through its effect 
on market price for water. If ex-ante production decisions by a market participant are 
considered, buyers will tend to use less water in the optimum and sellers will tend to use more 
water than in absence of uncertainty. As a result, both water demanded by buyers and water 
supplied by sellers are reduced and become more inelastic. Once uncertainty is resolved, the 
farmer can modify her initial production decisions, to reduce water use and sell it or to 
increase water use by entering the market as a buyer. 
The main conclusion of the empirical application is methodological and relates to the 
inclusion of the possibility of participating in the market at an uncertain price as a tactical 
response available for farmers. It has been shown that farmers’ profits are smaller the greater 
uncertainty is. If water markets are introduced as a tactical response in decision models then 
profits achieved through the market are greater than if only water uncertainty is modelled,   12
specially when uncertainty is higher. This result proves that hypothetical estimations of 
potential gains from trading water may undervalued, as they do not include the option to 
participate in them as a strategy in the decision process from which market participants’ 
behaviour is derived. 
There is a clear implication from the strategic point of view in the results obtained. 
Risk derived from taking production decisions under uncertain water supply gets reduced if 
farmers can enter an ex-post water market to complete their allotment or to sell surplus water, 
even at an uncertain price, as initial production decisions are more adequate. 
The inclusion of the tactical behaviour reduces the negative effect of uncertainty in 
terms of profit, making the resource more valuable, increasing water prices and reducing 
water exchanges. This favours those farms with annual crops, the ones more affected by 
uncertainty, specially those that are big water sellers. For farmers with permanent crops, who 
are potential water buyers, the inclusion of the water market as a tactical response worsens 
their market profits as the other farms respond more adequately to uncertainty and the 
resource gets more expensive. It can be said that uncertainty benefits those producers that are 
not affected by it and that, if the other farmers’ decisions are not properly modelled, profit 
achieved by the former is overvalued. 
In sum, it has been shown both theoretically and empirically that annual spot water 
markets allow reducing economic vulnerability for farmers derived from variability and 
uncertainty regarding water supply. If something is to be highlighted is the need to further 
analyse how the economic organisation of agriculture, and specially the access to productive 
resources, affects the economic risk faced by farmers. The existence of water markets in 
agriculture is a change, whose consequences go beyond the mere welfare increase. The 
possibility to exchange water re-orientates farmers’ decisions in a double way: it allows them 
to sell surplus water or to complete their allotment, but it also forces them to reconsider the 
profitability of all farm activities. The more relevant conclusions refer precisely to the 
implications of strategic nature that water markets have for users that operate in a context of 
water scarcity and, more importantly, of great uncertainty. 
 
Appendix. Expected utility maximisation by a participant in a spot water market. 
Expected utility of profit for a participant in a spot water market can be expressed as: 
E[U(πm(w))] = E[U(π(w) - Pm(w-D))]       [ a 1 ]  
First order conditions are derived in a similar fashion to those for the problem of 
maximising expected utility of a producer under output price uncertainty (Sandmo, 1971; 
Silberberg, 1990) and under water availability uncertainty (Howitt and Taylor, 1993). 
Taking derivatives in [a1], first order conditions are derived: 
E[U’(πm)(π’(w)-Pm)] = 0         [ a 2 ]  
Factoring condition [a2]: 
E[U’(πm)π’(w)] = E[U’(πm)Pm]        [ a 3 ]  
Subtracting E[U’(πm)Pm] from both sides of expression [a3]: 
E[U’(πm)(π’(w)-Pm)] = E[U’(πm)(Pm-Pm)]      [ a 4 ]  
Since E(πm)=π(w)-Pm(w-D), adding (Pm-Pm)(w-D) to both sides of this expression: 
  E(πm) + (Pm - Pm)(w-D)= π(w)-Pm(w-D) + (Pm - Pm)(w-D)          [a5] 
E(πm) + (Pm - Pm)(w-D)= π(w)  - Pm(w-D) = πm                [a6] 
where: 
πm = E(πm) + (Pm - Pm)(w-D)        [ a 7 ]  
IfPm  >Pm  and  w>D, then πm >E(πm), and, from the properties of the utility function, 
U’(πm)<U’(E(πm)), and therefore: 
U’(πm)(Pm - Pm) < U’(E(πm))(Pm - Pm)       [ a 8 ]    13
[a8] also holds for Pm <Pm and w>D. 
For w<D, and any possible value of (Pm - Pm), then: 
U’(πm)(Pm - Pm)>U’(E(πm))(Pm - Pm)       [ a 9 ]  
From expressions [a8] and [a2.38] are obtained [a10] and [a11] respectively: 
E[U’(πm)(Pm - Pm)]<U’(E(πm))E(Pm - Pm)       [ a 1 0 ]  
E[U’(πm)(Pm - Pm)]>U’(E(πm))E(Pm - Pm)       [ a 1 1 ]  
As E(Pm-Pm)=0, the [a10] and [a11] imply conditions [a12] and [a13] respectively: 
E[U’(πm)(Pm - Pm)]<0          [ a 1 2 ]  
E[U’(πm)(Pm - Pm)]>0          [ a 1 3 ]  
Substituting [a12] and [a13] in [a4], expressions [a14] and [a15] are respectively obtained: 
E[U’(πm)(π’(w) -Pm)]>0  for w>D       [ a 1 4 ]  
E[U’(πm)(π’(w) -Pm)]<0  for w<D       [ a 1 5 ]  
Implying that: 
π’(w) >Pm  for w>D         [ a 1 6 ]  
π’(w) <Pm  for w<D         [ a 1 7 ]  
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